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Levels of economic development vary widely within 
countries in the Americas. This paper argues that 
part of this variation has its roots in the colonial era. 
Colonizers engaged in different economic activities 
in different regions of a country, depending on local 
conditions. Some activities were "bad" in the sense that 
they depended heavily on the exploitation of labor and 
created extractive institutions, while "good" activities 
created inclusive institutions. The authors show that areas 
with bad colonial activities have lower gross domestic 
product per capita today than areas with good colonial 
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in the department to understand the role of history and institutions in the development process. Policy Research Working 
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org.  
activities. Areas with high pre-colonial population density 
also do worse today. In particular, the positive effect 
of "good" activities goes away in areas with high pre-
colonial population density. The analysis attributes this 
to the "ugly" fact that colonizers used the pre-colonial 
population as an exploitable resource. The intermediating 
factor between history and current development appears 
to be institutional differences across regions and not 
income inequality or the current ethnic composition of 
the population.Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Studying
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Levels of economic development vary widely between and within countries. In a sample of
eight of the largest countries in the Americas, the richest country (the US) has six times
the GDP per capita of the poorest country (Venezuela). Similarly, within these countries,
the richest state has on average seven times the GDP per capita of the poorest state1.
Many recent papers have argued that the variation in economic development across
countries is due to di￿erences in institutions (See Pande and Udry, 2005, for an overview
of this literature). However, few papers have studied why economic development varies
so widely within countries2.
At the cross-country level, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) provide evidence that colo-
nial factors can explain di￿erences in economic development. They argue that, depend-
ing on the local conditions, colonizers either set up extractive or inclusive institutions in
a given country. These institutions persisted over time and in￿uence economic outcomes
today. Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that the colonizers brought with them many other
things, such as human capital, which could also explain the e￿ect of history on current
levels of development.
This paper uses a related argument to explain within-country variation in economic
development across the Americas. Colonizers engaged in di￿erent economic activities in
di￿erent regions of a country. We claim that some of these activities were \bad" since
they tended to create extractive institutions and encouraged fewer Europeans to settle in
the area due to the fact that the production technology was inherently repressive. These
activities are plantation agriculture involving slavery and other forms of coerced labor
(sugar, cotton, rice, and tobacco) and mining. Other activities were \good" and created
inclusive institutions and encouraged more Europeans to settle since most individuals
performing these activities stood on an equal footing. Independent of the economic
activity, extractive institutions were also created in areas that had high pre-colonial
population density. In these areas, the colonizers often used the native population as an
exploitable resource (which was an \ugly" activity).
We then argue that institutions created during the colony persisted over time and
1Comparisons are based on data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, the US, and
Venezuela.
2Recent papers providing institutions-related explanations for within-country variation in develop-
ment include Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2005), and Iyer (2005) for
India; Rosas and Mendoza (2004) and Bonet and Meisel (2006) for Colombia; Naritomi, Soares, and
Assun￿ c~ ao (2007) for Brazil; Merrouche (2007) for Algeria; Huillery (2007) for French Africa; Acemoglu
et al. (2005) and Tabellini (2007) for Europe; and Mitchener and McLean (1999 and 2003) for the US.
1a￿ect current economic outcomes3. Areas with bad colonial activities should thus have
lower levels of economic development than areas with good colonial activities, which
included many other economic activities that did not rely on coerced labor. Similarly,
areas with high pre-colonial population density should have lower levels of economic
development today.
This line of argument is not entirely new and is largely based on Engerman and
Sokolo￿ (1997 and 2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, and 2005). The contribution
of this paper is mainly two-fold:
1. We extend the previous arguments to explain within-country variation in levels of
economic development. We present both anecdotal and empirical evidence sup-
porting a within-country correlation between colonial activities and development
today. In addition, we provide indirect evidence suggesting that institutions are the
mechanism through which history a￿ects current levels of economic development.
2. We argue, in contrast to Engerman and Sokolo￿, that having good colonial activ-
ities did not always lead to a good development path. Instead, the technologies
used in di￿erent areas with good activities were endogenous to the availability of
a local labor force. Areas suitable for good activities that had low pre-colonial
population density followed the predictions of Engerman and Sokolo￿ in terms of
creating a big middle class based on a disperse property structure. However, areas
suitable for good activities that had high pre-colonial population density tended
to feature exploitation of labor and have a high concentration of income. Some
areas that had good activities thus also had ugly activities.
We collect data on economic activities performed in di￿erent regions during the
colonial period for 16 countries in the Americas.4 Each region is assigned three dummy
variables summarizing whether it had predominantly good, bad or no colonial activities.
We also collect data on pre-colonial population density (mainly from Denevan, 1992 and
the references therein). The paper then correlates these historical variables with two
current measures of economics development for states or regions in the eight countries
(PPP GDP per capita and poverty rates). The results show that, in 2000, pre-colonial
population density is negatively and correlated with current GDP per capita. Going
from the 25th percentile in pre-colonial population density (-0.97) to the 75th percentile
3For the purposes of this paper, we refer to institutions as bundle of variables that may a￿ect long
run development, including the availability of human capital.
4The sample includes data for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
2(2.10) is associated with 24 percent lower GDP and 15 percentage points higher poverty
rates than other areas. The evidence on the e￿ects of areas with bad colonial activities
relative to areas with no colonial activities is weaker: even tough these areas have 10
percent lower PPP GDP per capita and 13 percentage points higher poverty rates than
areas with no colonial activities, the results are not statistically signi￿cant. However,
when we compare areas with bad activities to areas with good activities we observe
that areas with bad activities have about 15 percent lower GDP and 14 percent higher
poverty rates than areas with good activities. In other words, the type of activity only
has a signi￿cant e￿ect on current day development conditional on being colonized.
Comparing the e￿ect of good and bad colonial activities in areas with high and low
pre-colonial population density con￿rms our hypothesis that good colonial activities were
not always bene￿cial for economic development. In areas with low pre-colonial popu-
lation density, areas with good colonial activities have higher levels of GDP per capita
today than areas with bad colonial activities. But when good colonial activitis coincide
with high pre-colonial population density, the positive e￿ect of good colonial activities
goes away. In these areas, levels of GDP per capita are similar to the ones of areas with
bad colonial actitivies combined with either low or high pre-colonial population density.
We thus ￿nd that having good colonial activities together with high pre-colonial popu-
lation density had approximately the same impact on long run economic development
as having bad colonial activities.
Next, we study the mechanism that relates history with current development. Our
evidence indicates that formal institutions, and not income inequality or the current
ethnic composition of the population, are an important mechanism to explain the e￿ects
of history on current development.
Overall, the results suggest that the conditions faced by colonizers (in terms of the
size of the native population and the suitability for exploiting some minerals and cash
crops) a￿ected the characteristics of the social and economic institutions established in
the past and this a￿ects current development.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background.
Section 3 gives historical examples for the theory. Section 4 describes the data. Section
5 analyzes the relationship between colonial activities and development. Section 6 in-
vestigates the mediating factors between colonial activities and development today and
Section 7 concludes.
32 Theoretical Background
In recent years, many studies have investigated the ultimate determinants of economic
development. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005), Engerman and Sokolo￿ (1997, 2002),
and Easterly and Levine (2002) argue that levels of economic development in New World
countries go back to patterns of colonization. In particular, they argue that colonizers
shaped the \institutions" of New World countries. These institutions have persisted over
time and have a￿ected long-run levels of economic development5.
The types of institutions that Europeans set up in the countries they colonized can
be classi￿ed into two categories - extractive institutions and extensive \neo-European"
or inclusive institutions. Extractive institutions were intended to transfer as much as
possible of the resources of the colony to the colonizer (p. 1370, Acemoglu et al., 2001).
This colonization strategy did not require the introduction of extensive civil rights, pro-
tection of property rights, checks and balances against government power. It also did not
require a large number of Europeans to immigrate to the colony. This strategy therefore
discouraged investment in physical and human capital and had a negative impact on long
run levels of development. Setting up inclusive institutions, on the other hand, implied
putting into place constraints on government expropriation, an independent judiciary,
property rights enforcement, equal access to education, civil liberties, and unrestrained
immigration from Europe, thereby allowing Europeans to settle and thrive. Inclusive
institutions lead to high long-run levels of development.
Colonizers established extractive institutions in places where the net bene￿ts of hav-
ing extractive institutions exceeded the net bene￿ts of setting up inclusive institutions.
Three factors played a major role in determining the net bene￿ts of institutions. The
￿rst factor was settler mortality (Acemoglu et al., 2001). The higher the expected set-
tler mortality, the lower the probability of reaping future returns of establishing inclusive
institutions. The second factor was pre-colonial population density (Acemoglu et al.,
2002, and Engerman and Sokolo￿, 1997 and 2002). The higher the population density,
the higher the supply of labor that could be forced to work for the colonizers, making
extractive institutions more pro￿table and leading to the concentration of political and
economic power in the hands of small elites. Moreover, more prosperous and numer-
5The argument that economic development depends on institutions goes back to North and Thomas
(1973) and North (1981). There are several reasons why institutions may persist over time. In fact,
ruling elites replacing colonial powers after independence tended to maintain the same institutional
setting. As documented in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), in some countries, the elites controlling
political power were the same even well after the independence. There are a number of mechanisms
leading to inertia, even of ine￿cient institutions, as discussed in Acemoglu et al., 2005 and modeled in
Acemoglu et al., 2007 for the case of the emergence and persistence of ine￿cient states.
4ous societies probably had more structured tax systems (Engerman and Sokolo￿, 1997
and 2002), implying that colonizers could take control more easily of the systems to ex-
tract resources. The third factor was the natural environment for activities with strong
economies of scale (Engerman and Sokolo￿, 1997 and 2002). The higher the suitability
to exploit economies of scale, the higher the net returns of extracting current resources.
Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2002) present cross-country evidence supporting the
￿rst two factors. They show that potential settler mortality and pre-colonial popula-
tion density a￿ected European settlements. European settlements in turn a￿ected the
characteristics of early institutions. These institutions have persisted to the present
and have in￿uenced levels of economic development. Engerman and Sokolo￿ (1997 and
2002), in turn, examine the importance of the third factor, the natural environment of
the colonies, as well as the second factor, population density. They point out that the
New World countries that were the richest in the early years of colonization have nowa-
days fallen behind in terms of economic development. They argue that di￿erences in
\factor endowments" led to di￿erent degrees of initial concentration in wealth, in human
capital, and in political power. This initial inequality in￿uenced the type of institutions
set up in a given country. Inequality and institutions persisted over time and lead to
di￿erent levels of economic development in the longer run.
The factor endowments discussed in Engerman and Sokolo￿ consist of the natural
environment and pre-colonial population density. More precisely, they can be summa-
rized by three factors: soil, climate, and the size and density of the native population
(labor supply). The availability of these three factors led to the use of di￿erent pro-
duction processes in di￿erent colonies. Engerman and Sokolo￿ identify three kinds of
countries that used di￿erent production processes as determined by their factor endow-
ments. First, there is a group of colonies that can be exempli￿ed with Brazil and some
Caribbean islands that had soil and climate suitable for producing sugar and other crops
characterized by extensive economies of scale (cotton, rice, and tobacco). Given the e￿-
ciency of large plantations and the extensive use of slaves, economic and political power
became highly concentrated in areas where these crops were grown. They argue that
this concentration of power explains the evolution of institutions that commonly pro-
tected the privileges of the elite and restricted opportunities for the broad mass of the
population.
The second group of countries corresponds to a number of Spanish colonies, such
as Mexico and Peru, characterized both by the concentration of claims on assets in the
hands of a privileged few (especially valuable natural resources) and abundant native
5labor. The consequent large-scale properties were to some degree based on pre-conquest
social organizations in which the elites charged taxes. These large-scale structures, legit-
imated by the Spanish Crown (through the so-called encomiendas), survived even when
the main production activities did not display economies of scale. The key aspect was
that the rights to operate the tax systems were assigned to a small group of people.
Hence, as in the previous group of countries, these economies featured highly concen-
trated political and economic power that translated into exclusive institutions preserving
the power of the elite.
Finally, the third group of countries is composed of the colonies of the North Amer-
ican mainland (Canada and United States). These economies were neither endowed
with crops that displayed economies of scale nor with an abundant native population.
Therefore, their economies were organized into small units of production in a relatively
competitive environment. The existence of abundant land and low capital requirements
implied that most adult men operated as independent proprietors creating a relatively
egalitarian society in economic and political terms.
Engerman and Sokolo￿ illustrate with a number of examples and summary statis-
tics that the di￿erences in productive processes across New World countries translated
into very di￿erent patterns of su￿rage, public land, schooling policies, ￿nancial poli-
cies, and innovation policies among these countries. Easterly (2001) and Easterly and
Levine (2002) provide econometric evidence linking factor endowments to institutional
development. Both papers use a group of 11 dummy variables indicating whether a
country produced any of a given set of leading commodities (crops and minerals). East-
erly (2001) uses cross-country data to relate these measures, jointly the settler mortality
variable from Acemoglu et al. (2001), to a variable measuring the \middle-class con-
sensus" (i.e. the share of the three middle quantiles in total income). He shows that
factor endowments and settler mortality are correlated with the middle class consensus.
The middle class share subsequently a￿ects the level of schooling, institutional quality,
and openness of countries, and these variables a￿ect per-capita income. In a related
cross-country study, Easterly and Levine (2002) correlate factor endowments and settler
mortality with the development of institutions. They ￿nd evidence that these variables
a￿ect income only through institutions.
Overall, the existing literature indicates that colonial factors can explain di￿erences
in economic development across countries. However, they are relatively silent about the
e￿ects of colonial factors on institutions and development at the sub-national level. In
particular, if one takes the papers by Acemoglu et al. literally, colonial factors created
6homogeneous national institutions. In turn, Engerman and Sokolo￿ stress institutional
di￿erences between the North and the South of the US, but they do not generalize
the argument for other countries in the Americas6. Levels of economic development,
however, vary as widely across regions within a country as they vary across countries.
Table 1 shows a summary of GDP per capita (PPP) in di￿erent regions in 16 countries
in the Americas. For some countries, the standard deviation of GDP per capita within
country is almost as big as the standard deviation of GDP per capita across countries,
which is equal to 0.65 in our sample.
This paper builds on the arguments developed by Acemoglu et al. and Engerman and
Sokolo￿ to explain di￿erences in economic development across regions within countries7.
We point out that the local conditions faced by colonizers typically varied across regions
within a country. The productive activities performed by colonizers thus also varied
across regions. In fact, the three types of scenarios that Engerman and Sokolo￿ describe
for countries were often present in di￿erent regions within the same country. Based on
this, we argue that current levels of development within-country can be explained by
di￿erences in colonial activities8.
We classify the colonial activities performed in a region into four possible categories.
First, some areas had \bad" colonial activities. These activities were mining and sugar,
cotton, rice and tobacco plantations. They were bad in the sense that they depended
heavily on the exploitation of labor and created extractive institutions9. Second, other
6Engerman and Sokolo￿ brie￿y mention that countries with good endowments tend to have more
dencentralized political institutions (Gallego, 2006, provides evidence supporting this idea). But they
do not discuss the implications that decentralization of political power may have for development at
the sub-national level.
7One concern with going from the cross-country level of analysis to the within-country level is that
labor mobility is much greater within country. However, our aim is to explain existing current di￿erences
in economic development across regions that have clearly not been arbitraged away by migration. We
view institutions as social arrangements speci￿c to a region that are largely invariant to migration (this
is related to the argument of persistence explained earlier in this section).
8Several recent studies examine the e￿ect of di￿erent historical events on long-run development
within countries. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) show that land revenue systems established in the colony
a￿ect long-run property ownership and development across Indian districts. In a related paper, Iyer
(2005) ￿nds that the form of British administration in di￿erent Indian areas has signi￿cant e￿ects
on current levels of development. Similarly, Rosas and Mendoza (2004) and Bonet and Meisel (2006)
provide evidence that the patterns of (forced) settlement of slaves during the colony in Colombia are
correlated with current patterns of development. In addition, as previously mentioned, many papers
discuss di￿erences of development between the North and South of the US (e.g. Engerman and Sokolo￿).
Interestingly, the e￿ects of historical factors on development seem to be relevant not only among former
colonies, but also in Europe. Acemoglu et al. (2005 and 2007) show that both the expansion of
transatlantic trade and the Napoleonic invasions have a long-run e￿ect on development at the regional
level in Europe.
9Note that the silver mines common in Spanish colonies were typically large operations employing
many slaves for at least two reasons. First, silver was found in sub-surface mines, leading to economies
7areas had \good" colonial activities, such as wheat production and cattle raising. Third,
some areas had \ugly" colonial activities, in the sense that the colonizers heavily sub-
jugated and exploited the local pre-colonial population. Fourth, some areas were not
reached by the colonizers and therefore had no colonial activities.
Our argument di￿ers from Engerman and Sokolo￿ in that we claim that having good
colonial activities did not always lead to a good development path. Instead, the tech-
nologies used in di￿erent areas with good activities were endogenous to the availability
of a local labor force. Areas suitable for good activities that had low pre-colonial popu-
lation density followed the predictions of Engerman and Sokolo￿ in terms of creating a
big middle class based on a disperse property structure (as in the textiles or cattle areas
in New England). However, areas suitable for good activities that had high pre-colonial
population density tended to be dominated by exploitation of labor creating a high con-
centration of income. Examples are textile production in obrajes in Arequipa or cattle
raising in many haciendas in Latin America.
Some areas that had good activities thus also had ugly activities. In contrast, bad ac-
tivities such as mining or sugar production were highly pro￿table and had less ￿exibility
in terms of technology adoption since the technologies depended heavily on economies
of scale. In these cases the technologies used depended less heavily on the availability
of local labor because labor could be imported from other areas, using slavery, personal
service or the mita system.
In sum, the main hypotheses we test in this paper are the following
￿ Di￿erences in current levels of development within countries can be explained by
di￿erences in colonial activities.
￿ More speci￿cally, the abundance of local labor (measured by pre-colonial popula-
tion density) and the existence of bad activities (such as mining and cultivation of
sugar or cotton) have a negative impact on current levels of development.
of scale in production. Second, purifying silver required mercury. There were only two mercury mines
in the world, one in Peru and one in Spain. Both were controlled by the Spanish crown and corruption
and favoritism determined who got mercury in times when it was scarce. Many smaller mines had to
close their operations since they often could not get mercury (Cumberland, 1968). In Brazil, on the
other hand, mining focused on gold found in rivers, making it easier to enter into this industry with little
wealth. As explained in Naritomi, Soares, and Assun￿ c~ ao (2007), most miners held slaves in Brazil, but
the owner-slave relationship was of a di￿erent nature. Slaves had the possibility of hiding the gold they
found, forcing the owners to grant them more favorable conditions. In fact, slaves where often able to
accumulate enough wealth to eventually buy their freedom. Naritomi, Soares, and Assun￿ c~ ao mention,
however, that gold mining in Brazil was characterized by rent-seeking and a heavy bureaucracy, leading
to bad governance practices in these areas and thus also to lower levels of current economic development.
For the purpose of this paper, we abstract from this di￿erent channel and group it with the general
channel which we call "institutions".
8￿ The link between colonial activities and current levels of development are institu-
tions. Colonial elites created institutions that bene￿tted predominantly the elites
and not the population at large. These institutions persisted over time, and ac-
count for the lower level of economic development today.
In relation to the last point, note that we refer to institutions in a broad sense (i.e.
including government policies, such as access to education and to ￿nance, as described
in Engerman and Sokolo￿, 1997 and 2002). The previous literature has often referred
to institutions as constraints on the government and security of property rights and has
argued that these particular institutions drive economic growth. However, this literature
has emphasized the importance of institutions at the national level. At the subnational
level, constraints on the government may be less important, since these constraints
typically relate to the central government only, and policies and regulations may be more
important10. Clearly, regions within a country are subject to many common policies
and regulations set by the central government. However, in many countries, regions
also set their own local policies. Moreover, the way in which de jure national policies
and regulations are applied and enforced locally often varies, implying that de facto
institutions could be di￿erent. For example, Almeida and Carneiro (2007) document
that enforcement of labor regulation varies widely across cities within Brazil and that
areas with stricter enforcement have higher unemployment. Laeven and Woodru￿ (2007)
exploit the fact that state laws and also legal enforcement di￿er from state to state in
Mexico to show that average ￿rm size is larger in states with more e￿ective legal systems.
3 Historical Background
This section illustrates the hypotheses put forward in Section 2 with speci￿c examples.
First, we consider examples that compare states within the same country in terms of their
colonial activities and their current economic outcomes. These examples also discuss the
institutional framework that may link current levels of development to colonial activities.
Second, we consider an example in which the same activity (textile production) was
developed in di￿erent regions using completely di￿erent technologies depending on the
availability of labor. And, ￿nally, we provide an example in which the initial development
of an activity, (gold mining) using slaves led to the development of another activity (sugar
cultivation) using the same slaves.
In Section 2 we argued that plantation agriculture (sugar, cotton, rice, and tobacco)
10Glaeser et al. (2004) suggest that even at the national level policies favoring human and physical
capital accumulation have a stronger in￿uence on growth than contraints on the government.
9performed by colonizers led to extractive institutions and to lower levels of development
today. An example for this mechanism is the north-eastern region of Brazil which grew
sugar during the colony. Nowadays this region corresponds to the states of Alagoas and
Pernambuco. These states had very unequal societies during colonial times for two rea-
sons. First, sugar plantations used slaves, leading to the importation and subjugation of
many Africans. Second, since sugar areas were rich areas, they attracted more rich peo-
ple from the European elites. The sugar regions developed societal norms (institutions)
that bene￿ted only the elites and that did not leave room for the natives or slaves. The
following quote from Colonial Brazil describes society in the sugar regions
\While the old planter families tended to intermarry, room was always found for
sons-in-law who were merchants with access to capital or high-court judges and lawyers
bringing prestige, family name, and political leverage. Obviously, the arranged marriage
was a key element in the strategy of family success." (Bethell, 1987, p. 89)
In contrast to this elite dominated society stood S~ ao Paulo (formerly S~ ao Vicente),
a region that was not favorable to growing sugar. The region was poor during the early
years of the colony and displayed a very di￿erent societal structure. \Few Portuguese
women were attracted to the area and the Portuguese households and farms were ￿lled
with captive and semi-captive Indians. Illicit unions between Portuguese men and Indian
women were common and a large number of mamelucos (the local term for mesti￿ cos11)
resulted. [...] In the early period of S~ ao Vicente’s history, little discrimination was made
between mamelucos and Portuguese so long as the former were willing to live according
to what passed in the region for European norms." (Bethell, 1987, p.111-112) Colonial
society in S~ ao Paulo was thus comparatively inclusive. Societal norms (institutions)
bene￿tted a larger set of people than in the sugar regions.
Although Alagoas and Pernambuco were rich states during colonial times and S~ ao
Paulo was poor, their fortunes are now reversed. In 2000, PPP GDP per capita in
Alagoas was US$ 2,809 and US$ 3,531 in Pernambuco. In S~ ao Paulo, on the other hand,
GDP per capita was US$ 11,718. Poverty rates show a similar pattern. In 2000, they
stood at 46.5 percent in Alagoas (57.4 percent in Pernambuco) and 12.3 in S~ ao Paulo.
Section 2 also argued that areas with high pre-colonial population density devel-
oped extractive institutions during the colony and are therefore less developed today.
This pattern is well illustrated by comparing two Mexican states, Aguascalientes and
Tlaxcala. These states have similar background characteristics, but they had di￿erent
pre-colonial population densities. Both states are landlocked and have similar average
11Mesit￿ cos are people of mixed Indian and European decent.
10yearly temperatures and total rainfall. Aguascalientes had a pre-colonial population
density of about 14, while Tlaxcala had a pre-colonial population density of more than
￿ve times this number (about 80). In 2000, PPP GDP per capita in Aguascalientes
was US$ 11,558. In Tlaxcala it was US$ 4,873. In Aguascalientes, 13 percent of the
population lived under the poverty line in 2000, but it was 26 percent in Tlaxcala.
The link between colonial activities and current level of development may be insti-
tutions. The Aguascalientes and Tlaxacla example is consistent with this hypothesis. A
2004 Moody’s study creates an index of institutional quality (with respect to contract
enforcement) for Mexican states. The index runs from 0 (weakest) to 5 (strongest).
In this study, Aguascalientes obtained a value of 3.05, while Tlaxcala obtained 1.93.
Similarly, according to the World Bank’s Doing Business in Mexico 2007 report, Aguas-
calientes ranked number one for ease of doing business. Tlaxcala, on the other hand,
ranked number 22.
The contrasting organizational form in textile production in di￿erent regions pro-
vides an example of the mechanisms at work in our theory. Textile production in the
colonial United States was organized in many small scale mills and shops under prop-
erty ownership (McGaw, 1994, p. 396). In contrast, textile production in many Spanish
colonies was organized in obrajes de pa~ no12. Obrajes were large workshops that \inte-
grated every part of the cloth production process" (G￿ omez-Galvarriato, 2006, p. 377).
These workshops have been likened to modern day \sweat shops," and the labor force
was based on coerced labor (slavery, mita, etc.). Interestingly, obrajes did not exist in
Spain itself and were developed particularly for the colonies \with the techniques and
experience of Spanish masters and artisans" (G￿ omez-Galvarriato, 2006, p. 377). Textile
production in Spain was mainly organized in small shops, similarl to the United States.
People from the same nation thus chose a very di￿erent production technology for pro-
ducing the same product in di￿erent areas. Our hypothesis is that this technological
choice was in￿uenced by the availability of a coercible native population.
The obraje system had negative consequences for long-run development. G￿ omez-
Galvarriato (2006) claims that the strong dependence on coerced labor destroyed in-
centives for the accumulation of human capital among workers and increased income
inequality. It thereby contributed to the low levels of industrial development in many
areas in Latin America over the XIX century.
Finally, the history of sugar cultivation in certain areas of Colombia provides an
12Accordingly to G￿ omez-Galvarriate, obrajes were widely present in Latin America since the mid XVI
century, including places such as Puebla and Michoac￿ an in M￿ exico, Cuzco, Cajamarca, and Huanuco
in Per￿ u, Quito in Ecuador, La Paz in Bolivia, and C￿ ordoba in Argentina.
11example for persistence of economic and social institutions. The Paci￿c lowlands of the
Choc￿ o region had signi￿cant gold mining activities during the early colonial period. Gold
production relied strongly on slaves. McFarlane (2002) and Ocampo (1997) document
that, after many of the gold reserves were depleted, slave owners moved slaves from the
Choc￿ o region to sugar plantations in the neighboring Valle del Cauca and Cauca regions.
In this case, an activity that involved the importation of slaves seems to have a￿ected
the development of another activity using the same labor intensive technology.
Nowadays, Colombian regions that had mining activity or sugar cultivation during
the colony have an average PPP GDP per capita of US$ 5090. Regions that had other
activities, not using slave labor, or that had no activities today have an average PPP
GDP per capita of US$ 13,324.
4 Data
We constructed a data set that covers 332 regions from 16 countries in the Americas.
This section discusses general features of the data and data sources. A more detailed
description of the data is in the appendix. Appendix A presents the de￿nitions of all
variables. The sources for each variable are listed in Appendix A Table 1. A companion
dataset reports the values of the pre-colonial population density and colonial activities
data for each region.13
4.1 Measures of Economic Development
The main outcome variable of our analysis is the current level of economic development
of each department, province, region, or state in the data set14. This paper uses GDP
per capita to measure economic development. Moreover, we also use poverty rates at
the state level to measure economic development. Summary statistics for these two
variables are in Table 2. The data on GDP per capita and poverty rates comes from
country speci￿c sources. GDP by state come mostly from the statistical agency of
each country, which reports GDP by region. For El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Paraguay, data on per capita GDP at the state level come from national Human
Development Reports for each country. For all countries, data on population and poverty
rates come from each country’s demographic census or from household surveys. We try
to use de￿nitions that are compatible across countries to the largest extent possible.
Here we brie￿y mention some exceptions, which are discussed in detail in Appendix A.
13The dataset is available on-line at http://www.economia.puc.cl/fgallego
14In this paper, we use department, province, state, and region interchangeably.
12In terms of per-capita GDP, the most important deviation occurs for Venezuela. To our
knowledge, GDP is not available at the region level. Thus, we use per-capita income at
the region level from a household survey.
We de￿ne poverty rates according to the national de￿nition of poverty lines. This
may produce poverty rates that are not comparable across countries. To deal with this
potential problem, we run regressions using the log of our measures of development, and
we include country ￿xed e￿ects. This way, the variables used in the regressions (and the
estimated e￿ects) can be interpreted as log deviations from country means.
The outcome data we use is generally for the year 2000 (or for a year close to that
if data for 2000 was not available). For some countries, such as the US, it is a well
known fact that levels of economic development across regions have converged quite
signi￿cantly over the past few decades15. This implies that our estimates provide a
lower-bound on the e￿ect of colonial activities. It would be interesting to replicate the
results with earlier data to see how they change over time, but data at the state level is
not available for earlier periods for many of the countries in our sample.
In addition to measures of current economic development, we also use a proxy for
pre-colonization levels of development. This proxy is a pre-colonization health index
that comes from the Backbone of History Project (Steckel and Rose, 2002). Steckel and
Rose estimate a health index that goes from 0 to 100 based on archeological data. For
this paper, we match the location of the archeological sites to regions within countries.
This allows us to obtain information for 52 regions in our sample. As explained in more
detail in the empirical section below, we also include information on the estimated year
to which the archeological samples belong.
4.2 Colonial Activities
We construct three variables capturing colonial activities. First, we construct a measure
of population density before colonization at the region level using several sources. The
information comes mainly from the chapters and references in Denevan (1992). Denevan
provides estimates of the total native population for each country. For some countries, he
also provides estimates of the native population for regions within a country. Whenever
this is not the case, we complement this information with several other sources to arrive
at estimates of population density at the region level. Here, we lay out the main features
of this variable. Appendix B describes in more detail how the variable was constructed.
15Iyer (2005) also shows that the e￿ect of colonialism in India was stronger at the time of independence
than in the 1990s.
13The quality of the information on pre-colonial population density at the regional
level varies across countries and regions. For Argentina and the United States, Denevan
(1992) provides detailed information that allows us to construct measures at the state
level. For Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico, Denevan provides information for the
main geographic regions of the countries, and we match all current states to those regions.
For Colombia and Per￿ u, we use a similar procedure, but the basic information comes
from Ocampo (1997) and Villamar￿ ￿n and Villamar￿ ￿n (2000) for Colombia and Cook
(1981) for Per￿ u. For the remaining countries, the information is sparser, and we have to
rely on complementary sources. For Chile, Denevan provides information for the main
native group, the Araucarians. We complement this with information for other main
groups imputing population density estimates for a) the border regions of Argentina,
for some groups that lived in the North (the Diaguitas) and the South (several peoples
living in and to the South of Patagonia) and b) the border regions of Per￿ u, for some
groups that lived in the North (some groups linked to the Incas). The procedure for
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela is similar. Here, we use some information available
from Denevan and we impute information for regions in neighboring countries (Colombia
and Brazil for Venezuela; Argentina and Brazil for Uruguay; and, Argentina, Bolivia,
and Brazil, for Paraguay). For Central American countries, Denevan (1992) reports the
areas in which the native population lived before the arrival of the colonizers and we
match the implicit population density to current-day states belonging to these areas.
The estimated native population density varies from 0.01 people per square meter in the
Southern regions of Argentina and Chile to 392 in Mexico City.
Our other two colonial variables are dummy variables related to the main economic
activity performed during colonial times in di￿erence regions. We ￿rst identify the
main economic activity using history books for each country16. Next, we classify the
activities in good and bad activities following Engerman and Sokolo￿. Bad activities
include mining, rice, sugar and tobacco cultivation. Good activities include all other
agricultural activities, cattle, livestock, ￿shery, trade, naval stores, ports, textiles, and
wine production. Based on this classi￿cation, we construct two dummy variables. The
￿rst one indicates whether a region had good colonial activities. The second one indicates
whether a region had bad colonial activities. Some regions did not have any activities
since the colonizers did not reach them. The category \no activities" is the omitted
category in our regressions. The summary statistics in Table 2 show that 47 percent
of all areas had good colonial activities, 22 percent had bad colonial activities and 31
16The Appendix presents a detailed description of the sources by country.
14percent had no colonial activities. The corresponding percentages for the 8-country
sample are 49, 25, and 26 percent.
4.3 Intermediating Factors and Control Variables
We complement the previous information with a number of current variables that may
have been a￿ected by colonial activities and that may be the link between those activities
and current levels of economic development. The ￿rst of these variables is a measure of
income inequality, the Gini index17. Data on the Gini index come from local statistical
agencies and in some cases from household surveys. The second variable is the share
of the population that is native or black.18 Data on the ethnic composition of the
population typically come from the demographic census of each country. However, there
is heterogeneity in the way this variable is measured in di￿erent countries and surveys.
For example, in most countries, the surveys ask the respondents about their ethnicity.
For Mexico and Peru, however, the census instead asks whether the respondent speaks
a native language. We take this as a proxy for the share of the native population. Other
di￿erences in the data across countries are discussed in Appendix A.
Finally, we also include control variables in the regressions to control for regional
di￿erences in climate and geography. The climate variables are average temperature
and rainfall at the region level. The climate data typically comes from each country’s
statistical agency or meteorological institute. The geography variables are altitude and
a dummy variable indicating whether the region is landlocked.
Table 3 shows how the colonial activities dummies are correlated with pre-colonial
population density and with the control variables in our full sample. Areas that had high
pre-colonial population density are more likely to have good activities and are less likely
to have no activities. Average temperature is positively correlated with good activities
and negatively correlated with bad activities. Landlocked areas are less likely to have
bad activities and more likely to have no colonial activity.
5 The Effects of Historical Factors on Development
Section 2 argued that high pre-colonial population density and bad colonial activities are
correlated with lower levels of current economic development. We test these hypotheses
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17This variable is not available for Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
18These variables are not available for El Salvador, Honduras, Panama and Paraguay.
15where c refers to country, r refers to region, Y is a measure of development, Z is a vector
of historical variables, X is a vector of control variables, ￿ is a country ￿xed e￿ect, and
e is the error term.
The set of historical variables, Z, includes pre-colonial population density and dum-
mies for colonial activities that were, according to our hypothesis, more or less favorable
to development (\good" and \bad" colonial activities, with no activities being the omit-
ted category). The control variables, X, consist of climate and geography variables. The
standard errors are clustered at the pre-colonial population density level. The reason
for clustering at this level is that, as discussed in Section 4, in some cases, we impute
the same value for more than one region due to missing information.
We test the hypotheses stated in Section 2 in three separate regressions. First, we run
regression (1) including only pre-colonial population density in the historical variables
Z. According to our hypotheses, the coe￿cient on Z, ￿, should be negative. Then,
we leave out pre-colonial population density and include only a good activities dummy
and a bad activities dummy in the set of historical variables Z. The coe￿cient on
bad colonial activities should be negative, and the coe￿cient on good colonial activities
should be zero in this regression. The reason for the zero e￿ect of good activities is that
although good activities per se should have a positive e￿ect, areas with good activities
are also more likely to have high pre-colonial population density on average (as shown in
Table 3), counteracting the positive e￿ect. When we control for pre-colonial population
density and the type of activity in the same regression, the coe￿cient on good activities
should become positive.
In each regression, we test for the equality of the coe￿cients on the good and bad
activities dummies. The hypotheses imply that areas with bad activities should have
statistically signi￿cantly lower levels of economic development than areas with good
activities. Another way of testing this hypothesis to run the regression for the sample of
regions that had colonial activities, excluding the ones that did not have any activities.
Here we again expect the coe￿cients on pre-colonial population density and on bad
colonial activities to be negative.
First, we consider regressions for log GDP per capita (PPP). The regressions of
current log GDP per capita on historical variables are in Table 4. Column 1 of Table 4
includes only pre-colonial population density as a regressor, without control variables.
Pre-colonial population density is negatively and signi￿cantly related to current GDP
per capita. The coe￿cient of -0.078 implies that going from the 25th percentile in log
pre-colonial population density (-0.97) to the 75th percentile (2.10) is associated with
1624 percent lower GDP19.
Column 2 of Table 4 includes only the good colonial activities and bad colonial
activities dummies. The omitted dummy is no colonial activities. Areas that had good
activities are not signi￿cantly di￿erent from areas with no activities in terms of current
GDP per capita. Areas that had bad colonial activities, however, have 17.8 percent
lower GDP per capita today than other areas. The next column of Table 4, Column
3, includes all historical variables together as regressors. The coe￿cient on pre-colonial
population density remains largely unchanged. As predicted, the coe￿cient on the good
activities dummy now becomes positive, but it is still not statistically signi￿cant. The
coe￿cient on bad colonial activities becomes smaller and loses signi￿cance.
Columns 4 and 5 add the set of controls to the regression step by step. First,
Column 4 includes climate variables - average yearly temperature and total rainfall
and both of these variables squared. The temperature variables are not statistically
signi￿cant. Rainfall, on the other hand, is negatively correlated with GDP per capita.
When including the temperature variables, the coe￿cient on pre-colonial population
density remains signi￿cant and negative. The coe￿cient on good activities is still not
signi￿cant and the coe￿cient on bad activities now increases in magnitude but it is still
statistically insigni￿cant. This is also is true when we add geography variables, which
are not statistically signi￿cant. Column 5 shows this regression. The control for being
in a landlocked region controls for access to the sea and therefore works as a proxy
for transportation costs that could generate a number of negative e￿ects on trade and
development (See Frankel and Romer, 1999, Irwin and Tervio, 2000, and Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2005). We ￿nd a negative, but statistically insigni￿cant, e￿ect.
Although most of the regressions in Table 4 don’t detect a statistically signi￿cant
di￿erent between areas with bad colonial activities and areas without any colonial ac-
tivities (the omitted category), the F-tests in the lower panel show that areas with bad
colonial activities have about 14 percent lower GDP per capita than areas with good
19A negative coe￿cient on pre-colonial population density in this regression could also be due to
convergence if the pre-colonial production function was Y = L(1￿￿)N￿, where L stands for land and
N stands for labor and if there were a convergence process of the form: log(Yt=Nt) ￿ log(Y0=N0) =
￿￿log(Y0=N0), where t stands for the current period, 0 for the past, and ￿ is a function of the speed
of convergence. In this setup we get that: log(Yt=Nt) = ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)log(N0=A0). However, simulations
using this process and a time span of 400 years show that, at the speed of convergence that Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1999) ￿nd for U.S. states from 1880 to1980, namely 1.74 percent per year, the coe￿cient
on pre-colonial population density would have to be between 100 and 1000 times smaller in absolute
value than what we ￿nd, depending on the assumption of the share of labor in production. Thus, a
conventional convergence model cannot explain the magnitude of our coe￿cient. Moreover, notice that
our estimates are probably a lower bound of the true e￿ect of pre-colonization population density on
current development, given that our estimate of population density is measured with error.
17colonial activities. This ￿nding suggests that, conditional on being colonized, areas with
bad activities are less developed today. Table 5 investigates this result further by run-
ning the GDP regression without areas that did not have any colonial activities. The
OLS regression in Column 1, implies that, conditional on having had colonial activities,
the impact of bad activities is negative and statistically signi￿cant. In turn, the impact
of population density drops in size and is only marginally signi￿cant (p-value equals
0.107). These results may be contaminated by selection bias if regions that had colonial
activities were di￿erent in an unobservable way from other regions. In Column 2 we
estimate a Heckit model in which we control for selection bias by estimating a selection
equation that determines the likelihood that a region was colonized jointly with current
development20. Results for bad activities do not change with respect to the OLS re-
gression (in Column 1), but the coe￿cient on population density increases in value and
is now statistically signi￿cant. All in all, these regressions suggest that, conditional on
having had colonial activities, both population density and bad colonial activities have
a negative impact on development.
Figures 1 through 3 illustrate the relationship between current levels of economic
development and colonial activities graphically. These ￿gures are partial regression
leverage plots for the regression in Column 5 of Table 4, which includes pre-colonial
population density, colonial activities dummies and all control variables. Figure 1 shows
the partial correlation between log GDP per capita and log pre-colonial population
density. Figures 2 and 3 show the partial correlation between log GDP capita and good
and bad colonial activities. These ￿gures show that the identi￿ed relationship is fairly
robust and is not driven by some extreme observations or observations belonging to only
some countries.
In order to further examine the robustness of the results, Table 6 displays 16 di￿erent
runs of the regression from Column 5 of Table 4. Each row corresponds to this regression
with a di￿erent country excluded from the sample. The bottom panel of Table 6 includes
summary statistics for the 16 coe￿cients. The estimated coe￿cient on pre-colonization
population density is fairly robust. The coe￿cients on good and bad activities are never
statistically signi￿cant, but they consistently display the ￿nding that, conditional on
being colonized, areas with bad activities have lower GDP per capita today than areas
20Even tough strictly speaking this method does not require an excluded variable in the selection
equation, credible identi￿cation using this method requires using such a variable (Altonji et al., 2003).
Giving that the landlocked dummy is never statistically signi￿cant in the GDP regressions and is a
strong predictor for regions with none activities, we use it as the excluded variable in the selection
equation.
18with good activities21. Overall, these results imply that our main estimates are not
driven by any country in particular22.
Figure 4 provides additional evidence for our argument that good colonial activities
were not always good, depending on the level of pre-colonial population density. The
￿gure plots conditional averages of log GDP per capita, where the averages are calculated
based on the coe￿cients from a regression that includes a good colonial activities dummy,
a bad colonial activities dummy, a dummy indicating whether pre-colonial population
density is above the median, and interactions of these variables. The regression also
includes country dummies, as well as climate and geography controls. Standard errors
were clustered at the pre-colonial population level. The conditional averages show that,
in areas with low pre-colonial population density, areas with good colonial activities
have higher log GDP per capita today than areas with bad colonial activities. An F-test
indicates that this di￿erence is statistically signi￿cant at the 1.1 percent level. Areas
that had good colonial activities and high pre-colonial population density, however, have
about the same average log GDP per capita today as areas with bad colonial activities
and low pre-colonial population density. Areas that had high pre-colonial population
density and bad colonial activities do even worse in terms of GDP per capita, but
this di￿erence is not statistically signi￿cant. It thus appears that having good colonial
activities combined with high pre-colonial population density was about as bad for long-
run economic development as having bad colonial activities.
Table 7 considers poverty rates as an alternative measure of economic development.
The data set for poverty rates is slightly smaller than for GDP per capita since data
on poverty rates is not available for eight Colombian regions, two Honduran regions,
and one Argentinean region. Similarly to Table 4, Table 6 ￿rst shows the relationship
between poverty rates and pre-colonial population density alone. Then, it displays the
correlation between poverty rates and good and bad activities alone. Finally, it includes
all historical variables in the same regression and also adds control variables to the
21F-test results are available upon request.
22We have performed other robustness checks that we do not report to save space.
1. Results are robust to including double and triple interactions between climate variables and
altitude in order to control for the potential e￿ects of malaria on economic development following
Bleakley (2007).
2. Using data for six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the US), we have
run regressions in which we ￿nd that good and bad activities are not statistically correlated with
current state GDP shares in mining and agriculture. Population density is negatively correlated
with these shares. Therefore, it is not the case that our results are driven by a positive correlation
between colonial activities and current economic activities.
19regressions. All columns unambiguously show that current poverty rates are positively
correlated with pre-colonial population density. The coe￿cients imply that going from
the 25th percentile in log pre-colonial population density (-0.97) to the 75th percentile
(2.10) is associated with a 16 percentage points higher poverty rate.
Areas that had good colonial activities in the past do not have higher poverty rates
than areas that had no colonial activities. This result mirrors the ￿nding from Table
4 that good colonial activities do not have higher GDP per capita than areas with no
colonial activities. Similarly, here we ￿nd that areas with bad colonial activities have a
negative but not statistically signi￿cant e￿ect (equivalent to 13 percent higher poverty
rate than other areas in our preferred speci￿cation) relative to areas with no colonial
activities. However, areas with bad colonial activities have about 14 percent higher
poverty rates than areas with good colonial activities. This is di￿erence is statistically
signi￿cant, as indicated by the F-tests at the bottom of Table 7.
Our argument relies on the fact that colonial activities changed the economic fortunes
of certain areas. Before colonization, areas with higher population density and areas
where bad colonial activities were to take place should not have been worse o￿ than
other areas. If those areas were worse o￿ even before colonization, then there must be
something else other than colonization patters that explains these di￿erences. We would
thus like to verify that population density and the type of future colonial activity were
not correlated with economic development before colonization. This check is, however,
not easily done since there are no measures of pre-colonial GDP per capita or other
conventional measures of development at the region level.
To get a proxy measure of economic development, we use a health index which is
available for 52 regions in six of the sixteen countries in the full sample, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and the US. For some countries, the index exists only for some of
the regions. Moreover, some regions within the same country have the same values, since
the index is not always available at the region level. For these reasons, we do not include
country ￿xed e￿ects in the falsi￿cation exercise. The health index was calculated based
on di￿erent skeletons found in each region. These skeletons often come from di￿erent
centuries. To control for possible di￿erences in the quality of the data arising from the
of age the skeletons, we add the variable \year" to the health index regression. \Year"
is the average of all the estimated years in which the found bodies lived.
Table 8 shows the results of the falsi￿cation exercise. Pre-colonial population density
is positively correlated with our measure of pre-colonial development. The estimated
e￿ects is only marginally signi￿cant (p-value equals 0.13), possibly because the sample
20is quite small. However, areas with high pre-colonial population density have lower
levels of economic development today. Areas with bad colonial activities had higher
levels of pre-colonial development than areas with good colonial activities, although the
di￿erence is not statistically signi￿cant. Looking at current levels of development, the
result is reversed and areas with bad colonial activities have lower levels of development
than areas with good activities These ￿ndings could be interpreted as indirect evidence
in favor of the idea of reversals of fortune { more developed regions in the past tend to
be less developed in the present, Acemoglu et al. (2002).
Overall, evidence in this section shows a strong correlation between colonial factors,
in particular population density, and current levels of development. The e￿ect of these
colonial activities may operate through speci￿c factors such as inequality, institutions,
or the current ethnic composition of the population. The next section investigates this
channel empirically.
6 History and Development: Looking Inside the "Black Box"
What is the channel through which colonial activities in￿uence current levels of economic
development? The hypotheses in Section 2 suggest that extractive colonial activities
went along with the formation of an economic and political elite. As a result, society
came to be dominated by relatively few individuals, making it di￿cult for others to
prosper. Based on this theory, we look at two di￿erent measures, that are both related
to elite dominance, as possible channels linking colonial activities to current levels of
development.
The ￿rst possible channel is that extractive colonial activities led to higher inequality
which led to lower GDP per capita (see also Engerman and Sokolo￿ who develop this
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where I is a measure of inequality. This regression also includes the vector of historical
variables, Z, and control variables, X, as well as a country ￿xed e￿ect, ￿. We then
assess whether variable I could explain the e￿ects of colonial factors on development by
verifying wether







@I is the theoretical partial e￿ect of variable I on economic development (Y ).
Engerman and Sokolo￿ argue that more inequality leads to lower levels of development,
21implying that @Y
@I < 0. Therefore, the correlation of inequality and colonial activities
should have the opposite sign from the correlation of economic development and colonial
activities, such that sign(b ￿I) = ￿sign(b ￿).
Table 9 shows regressions of the log Gini index on colonial activities. Higher pre-
colonial population density is not associated with higher inequality today. Areas that
had bad colonial activities are more unequal today. The correlation between colonial
activities and inequality thus has the correct sign for being a possible link between
colonial activities and current levels of economic development. However, the magnitude
of the correlation between bad colonial activities and inequality is small relative to the
correlation between bad activities and current GDP per capita. Finally, in our preferred
speci￿cation, in Column 5, the di￿erence between areas with bad colonial activities and
good colonial activities is not statistically signi￿cant23.
The second possible link between colonial activities and current economic outcomes
are institutions. As discussed in Section 2, it is possible that colonial elites created insti-
tutions that bene￿tted predominantly the elites and not the population at large, which
in turn could have lowered investment in physical and human capital. If these institu-
tions persisted over time, they may account for the lower level of economic development
today.
In order to explicitly test this argument, we need a measure of institutions at the
sub-national level. To our knowledge, such a measure does not yet exist for the set of
countries in our analysis. Some of the countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, have some
measures or proxies for institutions at the state level. However, these measures di￿er
from country to country and the coverage within country is often limited.
This paper thus uses an indirect approach to test whether institutions are a plausible
link between colonial activities and current levels of economic development. If institu-
tions explain the e￿ect of colonial activities on development, then local colonial activities
should have less e￿ect on development in countries that have better institutions at the
national level. Put di￿erently, local elites in countries with good average institutions
should have binding limitations on exploiting their political and economic power. More-
over, good average institutions at the country level may have led to more convergence
23Nunn (2008) ￿nds evidence against the argument that inequality is the reason why colonial activ-
ities in￿uence current levels of development. He investigates the relationship between historical slave
holdings, initial land inequality and current levels of development for US states and US counties. He
￿nds that the areas that had a higher percentage of slaves in the labor force are less developed to-
day. However, initial land inequality is not statistically signi￿cantly related to current development.
Moreover, the relationship between slavery and current development is unchanged controlling for initial
inequality, suggesting that something else is the link between the two.
22over time across areas with di￿erent colonial activities. Testing this claim amounts to







rc￿ + ￿c + erc:
This regression is the same as Equation (1), except that it includes the interaction
term Z0N, which interactions local colonial activities, Z, with a measure of national
institutions, N. If the reasoning above is correct, the coe￿cients in ￿ should have
the same sign as before, and the coe￿cients in ￿ should be positive. To facilitate the
interpretation of the e￿ects, we measure institutions as deviations from the mean value
of institutions.
Table 10 presents the regressions with interaction terms. The measure of country
level institutions in Column 1 is average protection against expropriation risk, 1985-
1995, from the IRIS Center (University of Maryland), formerly Political Risk Services.
Acemoglu et al. use the same measure of institutions. The measure runs from 0 to
10, with higher values denoting more protection against expropriation and thus better
institutions. We choose this measure since it arguably is a summary measure for a
larger bundle of institutions. Using the World Bank’s Doing Business index of investor
protection for 2004 instead produces similar results.
The main e￿ects in Column 1 shows that pre-colonial population density is nega-
tively related to GDP per capita. The coe￿cient on the interaction term is positive and
signi￿cant, indicating that the magnitude of the negative relationship becomes smaller
when institutions at the country level are better. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 10 address
the concern that current institutions at the country level may be endogenous to levels of
economic development. In column 2, instead of using a measure of current institutions,
we use settler mortality from Acemoglu et al. in the interaction terms. As argued in
Acemoglu et al., settler mortality is an exogenous proxy variable for current institu-
tions, where lower settler mortality implies better institutions. Column 3 contains IV
estimates, where we use settler mortality as an instrument for current institutions. The
results in Columns 2 and 3 essentially mirror the ￿ndings from Column 124.
For all three regression, Table 10 displays F-test of the di￿erence between the coe￿-
cients on the good and bad activities dummies and their interactions with institutions.
Areas with bad activities have lower GDP per capita today, and this e￿ect is mitigated
by better institutions at the national level, although this e￿ect is not quite statistically
24As an additional check to control for the potential e￿ect of history through education levels, we
control for interactions of current levels of schooling (using data from Barro and Lee, 2001) and the
historical variables. The results are unchanged (Naritomi et al., 2007, ￿nd similar results).
23signi￿cant (at 15 percent level) in our preferred speci￿cation in Column 3. All in all,
the results in Table 10 suggest that the negative correlation between extractive colo-
nial activities and current levels of development is mitigated by good institutions at the
country level25. We take this as evidence for the argument that institutions are the
channel that links colonial activities to current economic outcomes.
Although we argue that colonial activities and current levels of development are
linked through elite dominance and institutions, there is another possible channel. Areas
with bad colonial activities also had black and native slaves, and areas with high pre-
colonial population had a high share of natives. These areas may thus have a higher
percentage of native or black population today. This could imply that these areas have
lower levels of economic development if natives and blacks face discrimination which
prevents them from achieving higher levels of production.
Table 11 investigates this possible channel. The dependent variable in Column 1 is
the percentage of natives and blacks combined. The coe￿cients show that areas with
high pre-colonial population density have a lower share of natives or blacks today. Areas
with bad colonial activities have a much higher share of natives and blacks than other
areas. To better explain this pattern, Columns 2 and 3 split up the dependent variable
into percent natives and percent blacks. The regression in Column 3 only includes
146 observations, since 11 countries in our sample don’t report which fraction of the
population is black, presumably because they have very few black inhabitants. The
percentage of blacks is only available for Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay and the
US, which are the countries where black slaves were more prevalent.
Column 2 shows that areas with high pre-colonial population density have fewer na-
tives today. This estimated e￿ect probably captures the fact that the colonizers exploited
native labor more intensely in areas with many natives, leading to a bigger decline in
the native population in these areas (as documented by Newson, 2006). This result
contradicts the argument that areas with higher pre-colonization population density are
poorer today since they have a large share of ethnic groups that face discrimination.
The results further show that areas with bad colonial activities have a higher share
25An additional implication of this hypothesis is that we should observe a negative e￿ect of institutions
on within-country di￿erences of per-capita GDP, i.e. countries with good institutions should have
less within country di￿erences in development. We do not have a big data set to test this claim
econometrically, but informal analyses including our 16 countries (and bigger samples) show a negative
and signi￿cant correlation between the standard deviation of log GDP for the regions of a country and
our country measure of institutions. Moreover, to deal with potential endogeneity problems, we run IV
regressions using settler mortality as an instrument for institutions and the results imply an even bigger
negative impact of institutions on the within-country variability in development. The regressions are
available upon request.
24of blacks than areas with no activities. Areas with good colonial activities, however, also
have a higher share of blacks. The coe￿cients on pre-colonial population density and on
the good activities dummy are not consistent with the current ethnic composition of the
population being the link between colonial activities and current levels of development.
If this were the correct link, both coe￿cients should have the opposite sign.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that institutions seem to explain the e￿ect
of colonial factors on current levels of economic development. Explanations only based
on inequality or direct e￿ects of the ethnic composition of di￿erent countries are not
supported by the data.
7 Conclusion
This paper shows that within-country di￿erences in levels of economic development in the
Americas can be explained by colonial activities. In particular, it provides evidence that
areas with a high supply of native labor and areas that were suitable for the exploitation
of mining and plantation agriculture have lower levels of current economic development.
The estimated e￿ects are economically relevant. Our estimates imply that going from
the 25th percentile in log pre-colonial population density (-1.16) to the 75th percentile
(1.75) is associated with 24 percent lower GDP than the country mean and that areas
that had "bad" colonial activities (i.e. mining and cash crops), have 14.7 percent lower
GDP per capita today than areas that had good colonial activities within the same
country. Moreover, we ￿nd that having good activities is only advantageous for long
run development in areas with low pre-colonial population density. In areas with high
pre-colonial population density, where colonizers often used the pre-colonial population
as an exploitable resource, having good activities leads to approximately the same level
of current day GDP per capita has having bad activties.
We also show that a key channel behind the correlation between colonial activities
on development today is related to institutions, and not to income inequality or the
current ethnic composition of the population. These results extend theoretical and
empirical ￿ndings of a recent literature that investigates the e￿ects of historical factors
on institutions and development at the country level. Moreover, our within-country
￿ndings show that it is not only the identity (nationality) of the colonizers that matters
for subsequent development, as argued by some papers. The identity of the colonizer
varies across countries, but we control for country e￿ects.
In general, our results support Engerman and Sokolo￿’s (1997 and 2002) argument
that the type of colonial activity preformed in a region mattered greatly for the insti-
25tutions in that region. Institutions in turn in￿uence current levels of economic devel-
opment. While we show that colonial activities are correlated with current economic
development, it remains to investigate the channel connecting them in more detail. For
the lack of measures of institutions at the region level, we use interactions with country
level data on institutions to investigate the link. The results suggest that institutions
are the channel. However, for future research we plan to construct region-level measures
of institutions and elite dominance. This will allow us to study the link between colonial
activities and current levels of development more extensively.
8 Appendix A: Variable Definitions
￿ PPP GDP per capita: Gross state product for each state divided by the contem-
poraneous population of that state and converted to PPP values using the 2000
value from the World Development Indicators. Due to data limitations, the data
for Venezuela corresponds to household income.
￿ Poverty rate: Percentage of the population living below the poverty line, according
to each country’s de￿nition of the poverty line.
￿ Gini index: Gini measure of income inequality for households.
￿ Health index: The health index measures the quality-adjusted-life-years (QALY)
based on the health status attributed to skeletal remains, which display chronic
health conditions and infections. The health index is adjusted for the age distrib-
ution of the population and is a simple average of seven health indicators: stature,
hypoplasias, anemia, dental health (teeth and abscesses), infections, degenerative
joint disease, and trauma.
￿ Pre-colonial population density: The ratio of the estimated pre-colonial population
to the area of modern states.
￿ Colonial activities: Predominant economic activity performed during the colony
in the region that matches the current day state.
￿ Average temperature: Average yearly temperature (￿C)
￿ Total rainfall: Total yearly rainfall (mm)
￿ Altitude: Elevation of capital city of the state (kms)
26￿ Landlocked dummy: This dummy is equal to one if the state does not have a sea
coast.
￿ Percent indigenous: Percentage of the population that is indigenous for all the
countries with the exception of (i) Mexico: the percentage of the population speak-
ing an indigenous language and (ii) Peru: the percentage of indigenous or black
(not only indigenous) since they are not reported separately.
￿ Percent black: Percentage of the population that is black (exists only for Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and the US)
￿ Percent indigenous or black: The sum of the pervious two variables
9 Appendix B: Pre-Colonial Population Density
This appendix describes in detail how we construct the pre-colonial population density
variable. We use data from several sources to estimate pre-colonial population density at
the state level. The main sources of information are region-speci￿c chapters in Denevan
(1992) and references cited in that book. This section presents the main sources for each
country and explains the assumptions we used to impute population estimates for the
di￿erent regions of each country. In each case we adjust the estimated size of the native
population in each country to match the numbers presented in Denevan (1992, Table
00.1). Appendix Table 2 lists our pre-colonial population estimates for each region.
9.1 Argentina
The only source of information we use corresponds to Pyle (1992), a chapter in Denevan
(1992). This paper includes several estimates of the native population for di￿erent
regions of Argentina. We take the average of the number of natives in each region
as our estimate of the denominator. In addition, using maps from the same paper,
we allocate di￿erent tribes or groups to the di￿erent modern states. As some of the
Argentinean regions identi￿ed in Pyle (1992) correspond to clusters of more than one
modern Argentinean states, we estimated population density for the regions presented
in Pyle (1992) and we impute the same population density for all the states in the same
region. In particular, the regions that include more than one state are: (i) Buenos Aires
and Capital Federal, (ii) Chubut, La Pampa, Neuqu￿ en, R￿ ￿o Negro, Santa Cruz, and
Tierra del Fuego.
279.2 Bolivia
The information for Bolivia comes from Denevan (1992) for the East of the country. We
also use estimates for the South Sierra derived from Cook (1981), implying a population
density of 17.3 people per square kilometer for the South Sierra. In addition, Denevan
(1992, p. 228) presents his preferred estimated population ￿gures for di￿erent regions
of Northeastern Bolivia: Floodplain (14.6 people per square kilometer), Lowland Sa-
vanna, mainly Mojos (2.0), Santa Cruz area (1.8), Upland Forest (1.2), Lowland Forest
(0.2), and Superhumid Upland Forest (0.1). Using estimates for the area of each state
belonging to each region, we estimate population density in each state.
9.3 Brazil
The main source of information is Denevan (1992, p. 226 and 231). Denevan presents
estimated population density at time of contact for di￿erent habitats in Greater Ama-
zonia, which includes most of the Brazilian states except for portions of the coastal
states in the South (Paran￿ a, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Sao Paulo). The
habitats (estimated population density at contact time) considered by Denevan are:
Central coast (9.5 people per square kilometer), Floodplain (14.6), Lowland{Amazon
Basin (0.2), Mangrove coasts (4.75)26, Upland and Central savannas (0.5). Using these
estimates we classify each Brazilian state in each habitat and we estimate population
density for the states. In the cases that a state has more than one habitat we use a
weighted average considering the di￿erent habitats. In order to identify the habitats
of the di￿erent regions we use information from the Natural Vegetation Map from the
Perry-Casta~ neda Library Map Collection of the University of Texas.
For the Southern states we also use information from Denevan (1992, Table 00.1) on
the total population for Southern Coastal Brazil combined (which implies a population
density of 4 people per square kilometer) with the previous information on the density
for the di￿erent habitats of the Greater Amazonia. Finally, we impute the population
density of the state of Goias to the Federal District (Brasilia).
9.4 Chile
In the case of Chile there are no detailed estimates of population by state. Instead, there
is some information on the location of several native groups, except for the Mapuche
people. In this case, Cooper (1946) quoted in Denevan (1992) estimates a pre-contact
26For Mangrove coasts, Denevan states "probably considerably less than 9.5 per square kilometer".
We use 50% of 9.5.
28population of the Mapuche people of between 500,000 and 1,500,000, and we use the
mean point of 1,000,000. We also know that these people were located between the
￿fth and the tenth region. So we estimate a pre-contact population density of 4.7. For
the other regions in the country, we know the location of other people and we take the
estimates of population density for these tribes in neighboring countries. In particular,
we know about half of the modern ￿rst region was populated by tribes linked to the
Inca empire. So we use half of the estimate we have for the Tacna region in Per￿ u, which
is equal to 1.3. For the second region, we know it was just sparely unpopulated so we
use an estimate of 0.1 (similar to the estimate used by Denevan, 1992 for other sparely
populated regions in Latin America). The third region was populated in part by the
Diaguita people, which also lived in the Catamarca region in Argentina. So we use half
of the estimate for 0.13 for the region and 0.1 for the remainder area of the region. The
fourth region was populated by the Diaguita people, so we use in this case the same
estimate as for Catamarca, equal to 0.17. Finally, the peoples living to the South of the
tenth region were basically the same as those living in the Argentinean Patagonia, so
we assume the same population density, equal to 0.01 people per square kilometer.
9.5 Colombia
We take the information on total pre-contact population for Colombia from Denevan
(1992, Table 00.1). He estimates a total population of 3 million people. Using informa-
tion from Ocampo (1997) and Villamar￿ ￿n and Villamar￿ ￿n (1999), we estimate population
densities for 8 regions: Eastern Cordillera (13 people per square kilometer), Cauca Val-
ley (9.2), the Caribbean Coast (2.8), Upper Magdalena (4.9), Lower Magdalena (4.3),
Pasto (7.7), and Llanos (1.3). In the case of the Amazonas region, we use estimates for
the Brazilian amazonas from Denevan (1992), which are equal to 0.2 people per square
kilometer. Next, we classify each modern state in one of these regions accordingly to
the Colombian maps of the Perry-Casta~ neda Library Map Collection of the Univer-
sity of Texas. Finally, the San Andr￿ es, Providencia and Santa Catalina islands we use
population density for the Caribbean islands from Denevan (1992).
9.6 Ecuador
Estimates for Ecuador are very sparse, and we apply estimates for neighboring countries
and complement them with some information available in Vieria Powers (1995) for the
coastal regions. We classify each state into the following regions: Central Andes (for
which we use an estimated population density of 12.1 people per square kilometer, which
29is the average for similar regions in Colombia and Per￿ u), Coast (for which use estimates
from Viera Powers that range from 1 to 2 people per square kilometer), Upland Forest
(1.2, from Denevan), and East (0.7 from similar regions in Colombia and Per￿ u). Using
estimates for the area of each state belonging to each region, we estimate population
density in each state.
9.7 El Salvador
Denevan (1992, p. 38) argues that population in Central America was mainly located
in the plain regions close to the Paci￿c coast "...where there were rich volcanic soils
from Guatemala to Costa Rica, and also in Panam￿ a". Thus, for all Central American
countries we keep this stylized fact in mind in order to assign populations to di￿erent
regions. In addition, Denevan gives an estimate of the total population living in El
Salvador before contact with colonizers of about 500,000. Thus, we classify all states in
two regions: Coast and Mountains. In the case of population density for mountains we
use 0.01 people per square kilometer and for the Coastal regions we use a population
density of 39.3 people per square kilometer, so that we generate a total population of
500,000. As for other countries, using estimates for the area of each state belonging to
each region, we estimate population density in each state.
9.8 Guatemala
As for El Salvador, we take advantage of the estimate of the total population from
Denevan (1992, p. 291). In this case Denevan gives an estimate of 2,000,000. To dis-
tribute this population in the states we proceed as follows. First, we consider the state
of Pet￿ en and parts of the Norte and Noroccidente states. For these states we use a
population density of 5.63 people per square kilometer, which corresponds to the simple
average of the population density of the Mexican state of Campeche and the estimated
population density for Belize. Second, we assign a population density of 23.60 to all areas
on the Coast (which correspond to parts of the states of Central, Suroriente, and Suroc-
cidente), where the value 23.60 is our estimate for the state of Ahuachap￿ an in Salvador.
This leaves us with a total estimated population of about 500,000 people. The remaining
population corresponds to the highlands, which were populated by Mayan tribes (such
as the Cakchiquel and the Quich￿ e). Thus, we assign 29.05 people per square kilometer
to these areas, so as to arrive at the total population estimated in Denevan.
309.9 Honduras
As for El Salvador and Guatemala, we take advantage of the estimate of the total
population from Denevan (1992, p. 291), which is 750,000 for both Honduras and
Belize. We assume a similar population density in both areas and therefore, we get a
total estimated population of 622,843 people for Honduras. To distribute this population
across the states we proceed as follows. First, we consider the coastal states of Choluteca
and Valle and parts of the state of El Para￿ ￿so. For these areas, we apply a population
density of 17.70, which corresponds to the simple average of the coastal states of La
Uni￿ on and Moraz￿ an in El Salvador. This leaves us with a total estimated population
of about 220,000 people. The remaining population corresponds to the eastern regiones
of the country, which were populated by several peoples, such as the Lencas. Thus, we
apply an estimate of 8.19 people per square kilometer to these areas, to get the total
population estimated in Denevan.
9.10 Mexico
Estimates for Central Mexico come from Sanders (1992), in particular for Mexico, DF,
Hidalgo, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Tamaulipas, and Morelos. In addition, Denevan (1992)
presents population estimates for the following regions: (i) Baja California Norte and
Sur; (ii) Campeche, Quintana Roo, and Yucat￿ an; (iii) Chiapas; (iv) Chihuahua, Du-
rango, Sinaloa, and Sonora; (v) Coahuila de Zaragoza and Nuevo Le￿ on; (vi) Colima,
(vii) and Tabasco. In the cases in which a region includes more than one state, we
impute the same population density for each region. As in all the other cases, we adjust
the population estimates so to match the total estimate for Mexico from Denevan (1992,
Table 00.1).
9.11 Panam￿ a
As for all other Central American countries, we take advantage of the information that
coastal areas were more densely populated. In this case, we use a population density
of 0.01 people per square kilometer in the mountain areas. For the coastal regions we
apply a population density of 30.88 people per square kilometer, so that we generate the
total population of 1,000,000 estimated by Denevan (1992, p. 291). Using estimates for
the area of each state belonging to each region, we estimate population density in each
state.
319.12 Paraguay
Estimates of the total population for Paraguay, Uruguay, and the South of Brazil in
Denevan (1992, p. 291) imply a population density of 0.9 people per square kilometer.
We use this estimate and estimates for neighboring regions in Argentina, Bolivia, and
Brazil, as benchmarks to estimate population density in di￿erent regions. In particular,
for Alto Paraguay we use the average population density of Santa Cruz (Bolivia) and
Matto Grosso do Sul (Brazil). For Alto Paran￿ a and Caaguaz￿ u, we use the estimated
population density for the interior areas of neighboring Paran￿ a (Brazil). For Amam-
bay, we just the estimate from Matto Grosso so Sul (Brazil). For Asunci￿ on, Central,
and Cordillera, we use weighted averages of the Argentinian regions of Corrientes and
Formosa. For Boquer￿ on we use population density from the Chaco region in Argentina.
For Caazap￿ a and Guair￿ a we use the simple average of the estimates for Alto Paran￿ a and
Misiones (Argentina). For Canindey￿ u we also use estimates for Alto Paran￿ a, but in this
case we take the simple average with population density for Matto Grosso do Sul. For
Concepci￿ on, we take the simple average of Matto Grosso do Sul and Chaco. For Itap￿ ua
we use the simple average of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) and Misiones (Argentina). For
Misiones we use the average of the Argentinean states of Corrientes and Misiones. For
~ Neembuc￿ u, we use a weighted average of estimates for Formosa and Chaco in Argentina.
For Paraguar￿ ￿, we use the average of estimates for Misiones (Paraguay) and Central. For
Presidente Hayes we apply the estimates from Formosa (Argentina). And, ￿nally, for
San Pedro we take the average of Presidente Hayes and Canindey￿ u. All these estimates
imply a population density of 0.9, similar to those implied in Denevan￿s calculations.
9.13 Per￿ u
The information for Per￿ u comes from Cook (1981) for most of the regions in the country
and from Denevan (1992) for the East of the country. In particular, Cook (1981, p.
96) presents his preferred estimated population ￿gures for six di￿erent Peruvian regions:
North coast, Central coast, South coast, North sierra, Central sierra, and South sierra.
From Denevan (1992, pp. 228), we estimate the population density for six regions located
in the East of the country: Amazonas (50% of the area), Loreto, Madre de Dios, Puno
(50% of the area), and Ucayali.
329.14 United States
The raw information on the native population of the United States comes from Ubelaker
(1992). This paper presents information on the native population of all the tribes in
the United States and the location of these tribes (see Map 8.1, p. 244). Using this
information we assign each tribe to the modern US states and in this way we estimate
pre-contact population densities. In some cases it was impossible to estimate population
densities for speci￿c states because some tribes lived in more than one state so we present
population density estimates for groups of modern states. This is the case for: 1. Arizona
and New Mexico; 2. Delaware and New Jersey; 3. Rhode Island and Massachusetts; 4.
Maryland and Washington D.C.; and 5. Virginia and West Virginia.
9.15 Uruguay
First, we consider a number of regions for which there was no evidence of being settled
by natives. The states of Artigas, Flores, Florida, Lavallejana, Montevideo, Rivera,
Canelones, Maldonado, and San Jos￿ e fall into this category. We assign a population
density of 0.01 people per square kilometer to all these states. Next, we consider regions
in which there was some evidence of settlements by some peoples, such as the Gueonas,
Chan￿ a, Bohan, and Charrua. These states are Cerro Largo, Colonia, Paysand￿ u, Rocha,
Salto, Tacuarembo, and Treinta y Tres, and we assign them a population density of 0.05
people per square kilometer. Finally, the remaining three states of Durazno, Soriano,
R￿ ￿o Negro were more heavily settled by peoples such as the Yaros, Chan￿ a, and Charruas,
and we assign them a weighted average of population density estimated for Entre R￿ ￿os
(Argentina), where the weights are increasing in the area closer to this region.
9.16 Venezuela
Denevan (1992) presents estimates for the total pre-contact population of Venezuela
and gives pre-contact population densities for the Orinoco llanos (1.3 people per square
kilometer), Amazon Basin (0.2), and Guiana Highlands (less than 0.5 people per square
kilometer, we use 0.4). In order to get estimates for the other regions of Venezuela, ￿rst
we use estimates available from other countries with similar habitats and native groups
in the region (in particular, from North and East Colombia and the Caribbean) in the
following way: 1. the Caribbean Coast: we use estimates for the same habitat in the
Colombian Caribbean Coast; 2. the Selva: we use estimates for the same habitat in
Colombia, and 3. the Caribbean (the Dependencias Federales region): we use estimates
33from Denevan for the Caribbean islands. Finally, we estimate population density for the
Coastal Ranges and the Eastern Andes by choosing a pre-contact population density
that matches the total population of about 1,000,000 people for Venezuela, as presented
in Denevan (1992, Table 00.1).
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Figure 2 – Partial Correlation Between Log GDP per Capita 
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Low pre-colonial population density High pre-colonial population density
 
 
Note: Low and high pre-colonial population density are defined as below and above the median. 
The averages are calculated based on the coefficients from a regression that includes a good 
colonial activities dummy, a bad colonial activities dummy, a dummy indicating whether pre-
colonial population density is above the median, and interactions of these variables. It also 
includes country dummies, as well as climate and geography controls. Standard errors were 
clustered at the pre-colonial population level. 
  43 
Country Obs Mean Log S.D. Min Max Ratio ymax/ymin
Argentina* 24 11706 0.553 4578 40450 8.84
Bolivia 9 2715 0.395 1245 4223 3.39
Brazil 27 5754 0.576 1793 17596 9.81
Chile 13 8728 0.423 4154 19820 4.77
Colombia 30 5869 0.489 2368 22315 9.43
Ecuador 22 5058 0.834 1458 26574 18.23
Salvador 14 3237 0.286 2191 5954 2.72
Guatemala 8 3563 0.439 2100 8400 4.00
Honduras 18 2108 0.140 1716 2920 1.70
Mexico 32 8818 0.461 3664 23069 6.30
Panama 9 4336 0.676 1805 12696 7.04
Paraguay 18 4513 0.293 2843 7687 2.70
Peru 24 3984 0.570 1287 13295 10.33
US 48 32393 0.179 22206 53243 2.40
Uruguay 19 6723 0.231 3902 10528 2.70
Venezuela** 19 5555 0.231 3497 9088 2.60
*Data for 1993, **Income data





Outcome variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log PPP GDP per capita 332 8.75 0.90 7.13 10.88
Log poverty rate 321 2.93 0.93 0.21 4.40
Health Index 52 4.24 0.34 2.95 4.52
Log Gini 258 -0.74 0.15 -1.15 -0.46
Percent native or black 217 9.95 16.27 0.09 138.86
Percent native 275 8.48 16.66 0.01 85.24
Percent black 146 6.58 9.23 0.00 65.66
Historical variables
Log pre-colonial population density 332 0.31 2.31 -6.91 5.97
Good activities dummy 332 0.47 0.50 0 1
Bad activities dummy 332 0.22 0.42 0 1
Control variables
Avg. temperature 332 19.97 5.83 2.38 29
Total rainfall 332 1.28 0.95 0.00 8.13
Landlocked dummy 332 0.57 0.50 0 1
Altitude 332 0.66 0.92 0 4.33
Table 2: Summary Statistics
 
  44Good acivities Bad activities No activities
(1) (2) (3)
Log pre-colonial pop dens 0.089 -0.003 -0.086
[0.023]*** [0.017] [0.022]***
Avg. temperature -0.091 0.085 0.006
[0.032]*** [0.024]*** [0.029]
Avg. temp. squared 0.002 -0.002 0
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]
Total rainfall -0.028 -0.028 0.055
[0.064] [0.059] [0.070]
Total rainfall squared -0.008 0.011 -0.003
[0.010] [0.008] [0.013]
Landlocked dummy -0.007 -0.158 0.166
[0.075] [0.058]*** [0.070]**
Altitude 0.201 -0.077 -0.124
[0.102]** [0.090] [0.079]
Altitude squared -0.088 0.078 0.01
[0.030]*** [0.026]*** [0.022]
Observations 332 332 332
R squared 0.19 0.21 0.26
Table 3: Predicting Colonial Activities
Dependent variable:
Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) in 
brackets. Regressions include country fixed effects. Significance levels: * 






  45(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log pre-colonial pop density -0.078*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.078***
[0.024] [0.023] [0.022] [0.021]
Good activities dummy -0.020 0.067 0.049 0.044
[0.088] [0.075] [0.074] [0.071]
Bad activities dummy -0.178* -0.102 -0.129 -0.103
[0.092] [0.083] [0.083] [0.078]
Avg. temperature 0.030 0.026
[0.035] [0.031]
Avg. temp. squared -0.001 -0.001*
[0.001] [0.001]
Total rainfall -0.174** -0.167**
[0.086] [0.084]
Total rainfall squared 0.021 0.018
[0.020] [0.020]






Observations 332 332 332 332 332
R-squared 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79
F test: Good = Bad - 6.25 7.40 7.39 5.48
P-value - 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.020
Table 4: Colonial Activities and Current GDP per Capita
Dependent variable: Log PPP GDP per capita
Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) in brackets. 










  46(1) (2)
Log Population -0.043 -0.058
[0.026] [0.033]*
Bad Activities -0.137 -0.134
[0.061]** [0.059]**
Average Temperature 0.059 0.063
[0.027]** [0.027]**














Estimation technique OLS Heckit
Table 5: Colonial Activities and Current GDP per Capita - Excluding Regions without 
Colonial Activities
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%
Dependent Variable: Log PPP GDP per capita
 
 
  47Country excluded Log pre-col pop dens Good Activities Bad Activities Observations R-squared
Argentina -0.067 0.081 -0.085 308 0.8
[0.023]*** [0.071] [0.080]
Bolivia -0.079 0.041 -0.104 323 0.79
[0.021]*** [0.070] [0.078]
Brazil -0.075 0.026 -0.131 305 0.81
[0.022]*** [0.071] [0.081]
Chile -0.078 0.056 -0.084 319 0.8
[0.023]*** [0.073] [0.080]
Colombia -0.071 0.087 -0.076 302 0.83
[0.022]*** [0.065] [0.069]
Ecuador -0.062 0.081 -0.024 310 0.83
[0.020]*** [0.066] [0.070]
Salvador -0.077 0.033 -0.111 320 0.79
[0.021]*** [0.074] [0.079]
Guatemala -0.078 0.041 -0.128 324 0.8
[0.021]*** [0.071] [0.078]
Honduras -0.077 0.037 -0.129 314 0.78
[0.022]*** [0.075] [0.082]
Mexico -0.092 0.066 -0.093 300 0.81
[0.021]*** [0.072] [0.085]
Panama -0.07 0.017 -0.121 323 0.8
[0.019]*** [0.068] [0.077]
Paraguay -0.076 0.033 -0.111 314 0.8
[0.021]*** [0.075] [0.080]
Peru -0.073 0.025 -0.093 308 0.8
[0.022]*** [0.075] [0.083]
US -0.083 0.066 -0.096 284 0.55
[0.025]*** [0.081] [0.095]
Uruguay -0.091 0.05 -0.099 313 0.8
[0.025]*** [0.076] [0.081]
Venezuela -0.077 0.053 -0.107 313 0.8
[0.021]*** [0.074] [0.081]
None -0.078 0.044 -0.103 332 0.79
[0.021]*** [0.071] [0.078]
Statistics Log pre-col pop dens Good Activities Bad Activities Observations R-squared
Average -0.077 0.050 -0.100 311 0.787
Median -0.077 0.046 -0.102 313 0.800
Max -0.062 0.087 -0.024 332 0.83
Min -0.092 0.017 -0.131 284 0.55
Dependent variable: Log PPP GDP per capita






  48(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log pre-colonial pop density 0.054** 0.057** 0.054** 0.048**
[0.027] [0.025] [0.023] [0.022]
Good activities dummy -0.015 -0.075 -0.034 -0.015
[0.090] [0.077] [0.077] [0.066]
Bad activities dummy 0.175* 0.122 0.157* 0.127
[0.095] [0.085] [0.088] [0.082]
Avg. temperature 0.002 0.02
[0.043] [0.035]
Avg. temp. squared 0 0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
Total rainfall 0.267*** 0.253***
[0.082] [0.077]








Observations 321 321 321 321 321
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.82
F test: Good = Bad - 7.03 7.94 7.21 4.87
P-value - 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.029
Table 7: Colonial Activities and Current Poverty Rates
Dependent variable: Log poverty rate
Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) in brackets. 
Regressions include country fixed effects. The data set is smaller than in Table 4 since data 
on poverty rates is not available for eight Colombian regions and one Argentinean region. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%  
  49Log health index Log PPP GDP per capita
(1) (2)
Log pre-colonial pop dens 0.079 -0.125
[0.052] [0.079]
Good activities dummy -0.207 -0.209
[0.164] [0.314]
Bad activities dummy -0.007 -0.315
[0.123] [0.385]




F test: Good = Bad 1.66 0.28
Prob 0.202 0.600
Table 8: Colonial Activities and Pre-Colonial Development
Dependent variable:
Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) in 
brackets. Regressions include control variables. Health index is a proxy of pre-
colonial development. The health index regression controls for the year for which the 
health index is observed to control for differences in the quality of the index. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
 
 
  50(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log pre-colonial pop density 0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.001
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Good activities dummy 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.004
[0.015] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Bad activities dummy 0.041 0.037** 0.036** 0.026
[0.018]** [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]*
Avg. temperature 0.007** 0.009
[0.004] [0.005]*
Avg. temp. squared -0.000* 0
[0.000] [0.000]
Total rainfall 0.005 0.006
[0.021] [0.021]








Observations 258 258 258 258 258
R-squared 0.7 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72
F test: Good = Bad - 5.66 5.82 5.33 2.40
P-value - 0.018 0.017 0.022 0.123
Table 9: Colonial Activities and Current Income Inequality
Dependent variable: Log Gini
Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) in brackets. 
Regressions include country fixed effects. The data set is smaller than in Table 4 since data on 
poverty rates is not available for eight Colombian regions and two Argentinean regions. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%  
 
  51(1) (2) (3)
Log pre-colonial pop dens -0.096 -0.078 -0.092
[0.023]*** [0.022]*** [0.025]***
Good activities dummy 0.064 0.05 0.063
[0.071] [0.075] [0.082]
Bad activities dummy -0.092 -0.107 -0.108
[0.087] [0.089] [0.097]
Log pop dens*Country institutions 0.046 0.041
[0.013]*** [0.018]**
Good activities*Country institutions -0.035 -0.036
[0.030] [0.045]
Bad activities*Country institutions 0.008 0.034
[0.039] [0.041]
Log pop dens*Country settler mortality -0.073
[0.033]**
Good activities*Country settler mortality 0.068
[0.085]
Bad activities*Country settler mortality -0.071
[0.085]
Observations 332 332 332
R-squared 0.8 0.8 -
F test: Good = Bad 4.8 5.37 5.49
P-value 0.030 0.022 0.020
F test: Good*Country institutions = Bad*Country institutions 1.02 1.94 2.06
P-value 0.314 0.165 0.153
Estimation method OLS OLS IV
Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) in brackets. Regressions include country fixed 
effects and control variables. Country institutions is a measure of protection against expropriation risk. In Column (3), settler 
mortality is the instrument for country instiutions, from Acemoglu et al (2001). Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Dependent variable: 
Log PPP GDP per capita




  52(1) (2) (3)
Log pre-colonial pop density -1.567 -0.709 -0.576
[0.473]*** [0.325]** [0.383]
Good activities dummy 0.796 -1.55 2.404
[1.671] [1.376] [1.429]*
Bad activities dummy 5.576 -1.938 7.082
[1.964]*** [1.902] [1.606]***
Observations 217 275 146
R-squared 0.57 0.6 0.64
F test: Good = Bad 4.99 0.05 6.61
P-value 0.027 0.830 0.012
Table 11: Colonial Activities and Ethnicity of Current Population
Dependent variable:
Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) 
in brackets. Regressions include country fixed effects and control variables. 







  53Appendix A - Table A1: Data Sources 
 
Variable Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile
GDP INDEC - Dirección de 
Cuentas Nacionales - PBG 
por provincia y sector de 
actividad económica
Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas de Bolivia - 
PIB departamental
IBGE - Contas Regionais Central Bank of Chile
Population INDEC - Censo Nacional 
de Población, 
Hogares y Viviendas 2001
Instituto Nacional de 





based on 2002 Census
Poverty rate INDEC - EPH - May 2001 Instituto Nacional de 




MIDEPLAN - 2000 CASEN
GINI index Own calculations from 1998 
EPH
Calvo (2000) IBGE - 
Censo Demográfico 2000





Own calculations from Pyle 
(1992)
Own calculations from 
Denevan (1992)
Own calculations from 
Denevan (1992)
Own calculations from 
Denevan (1992)
Colonial acitvities Brown (2003), Rock (1987) Peñaloza (1981), Arze 




Collier and Sater (2004)
Temperature Servicio Metereológico 
Nacional




Annuário estatístico do 
Brazil.
Dirección Metereológica de 
Chile
Rainfall Servicio Metereológico 
Nacional




Annuário estatístico do 
Brazil.





INDEC - Censo Nacional 
de Población, 
Hogares y Viviendas 2001
Instituto Nacional de 




Own calculations from 2000 
CASEN
Variable Colombia Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala
GDP
DANE - Cuentas 
Departamentales
Banco Central del 
Ecuador - Cuentas 
Provinciales
Informe del Desarrollo 
Humano El Salvador (2005)
Informe del Desarrollo 
Humano Guatemala (2002)
Population DNP projections - 2000 Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas y Censos, 
2001 Census
Dirección General de 
Estadísticas y Censos, 
projections 2005
Informe del Desarrollo 
Humano Guatemala (2002)
Poverty rate SISD Informe sobre 
Desarrollo Humano, 
Ecuador 2001. PNUD
Compendio Estadistico Informe Nacional de 
Desarrollo Humano 
Guatemala (2005)
GINI index SISD Informe sobre 
Desarrollo Humano, 
Ecuador 2001. PNUD
Informe sobre Desarrollo 
Humano, El Salvador 2005. 
PNUD.






Own calculations from 
Denevan (2002), Ocampo 
(1997), and Villamarín 
(1999)
Own calculations from 
Denevan (1992)
Own calculations from 
Denevan (1992)
Own calculations from 
Denevan (1992)
Colonial acitvities McFarlane (1993), Ocampo 
(1997)
Reyes, Oscar Efren 





Webre, Stephen (1989); 
Jiménez, Alfredo (1997)
Temperature IDEAM Instituto Nacional de 
Meteorología e 
Hidrología
Servicio Nacional de 
Estudios Territoriales - 
Perfiles Climatológicos
Instituto Nacional De 
Sismologia, Vulcanología, 
Meteorología E Hidrologia
Rainfall IDEAM Instituto Nacional de 
Meteorología e 
Hidrología
Servicio Nacional de 
Estudios Territoriales - 
Perfiles Climatológicos






DANE CEPAL (2005) - Informe Nacional de 
Desarrollo Humano 
Guatemala (2005)
Backbone of History Project (Steckel and Rose, 2002)
Global Gazetteer Version 2.1 (www.fallingrain.org)
Backbone of History Project (Steckel and Rose, 2002)
Global Gazetteer Version 2.1 (www.fallingrain.org)
 
  54Variable Honduras Mexico Panama Paraguay
GDP




Interno Bruto por Entidad 
Federativa
Dirección de Estadísticas y 
Censos, PIB Provincial
Atlas de Desarrollo 
Humano Paraguay 2005
Population
Informe del Desarrollo 
Humano Guatemala 
(2002)
INEGI - Censo General de 
Población y Vivienda 2000
Dirección de Estadísticas y 
Censos, 2000 Census
Dirección General de 
Estadísticas, Encuestas y 
Censos
Poverty rate
Informe sobre Desarrollo 
Humano 2002. PNUD SEDESOL
Ministerio de Economia y 










Own calculations from 
Denevan (2002) 
Own calculations from 
Denevan (2002) 
and Sanders (2002)
Own calculations from 
Denevan (2002) 











Ots y Capdequí (1810)














INEGI - Censo General de 
Población y Vivienda 2000
--
Variable Peru US Uruguay Venezuela
GDP
INEI - Dirección 
Nacional de Cuentas 
Nacionales - PBI por 
departamento.
BEA - Gross Domestic 
Product by State
Anuario Diario El País 
2001
Own calculations from 
1998 EHM (household 
income)
Population INEI U.S. Census Bureau




State and Metropolitan Area 
Data Book 1997-1998




Own calculations from 
2000 ENAHO
U.S. Census Bureau, Table 
S4





Own calculations from 
Denevan (2002) and 
Cook (1981)
Own calculations from 
Ubelaker (2002)
Own calculations from 
Denevan (2002)
Own calculations from 
Denevan (2002)
Colonial acitvities




McCusker and Menard 
(1985)
Bauza, Francisco (1895); 














U.S. Census Bureau, 
Population Division
Bucheli and Cabela (2006)
INE - 2001 Census
Backbone of History Project (Steckel and Rose, 2002)
Global Gazetteer Version 2.1 (www.fallingrain.org)
Backbone of History Project (Steckel and Rose, 2002)
Global Gazetteer Version 2.1 (www.fallingrain.org)
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